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Much has already been written about imprévision, frustration 
and impracticability in commercial contracts (Pédamon & 
Chuah, Hardship in Transnational Commercial Contracts, (Paris 
Legal Publishers, 2013)). It is however necessary to revisit 
the theory and practice of hardship in light of the new legal 
provision (Art 1195 CC) of the rewritten Civil code (CC) that 
now enshrines the theory of imprévision (unforeseeability) in 
French law.
The Ordonnance no 2016-131 of 10 February 2016 has 
implemented a reform of the law of contracts, the general 
regime of obligations and the proof of obligations that had 
remained nearly untouched since the original iteration of the 
Civil code in 1804 (See Pédamon, The New French Contract 
Law and its Impact on Commercial Law, in Heidemann, M and 
Lee, J (eds) The Future of the Commercial Contract in Scholarship 
and Law Reform: European and Comparative Perspectives, (Springer, 
2018)). It has introduced a new article – Article 1195 CC – 
that ushers in a radical change from the well-anchored rejection 
of the theory of imprévision set in case law that dates back to the 
19th century. It grants the judge power to review the contract 
upon the request of one party. In the Parliamentary debates 
for the ratification of the Ordonnance, the Senate attempted 
to limit this judicial power by requiring both parties to ask 
for this. It considered the unilaterally triggered power contrary 
to legal certainty as it could generate more litigation. After 
debate, the senators did agree upon the unilateral formulation 
of the current article on the basis that the provision is only a 
default rule and that in the case where a party asks the judge 
to adjust the contract, the other party is likely to request its 
termination, termination that the judge is likely to uphold. 
The senators nevertheless excluded securities transactions and 
financial contracts from the article (see the report prepared by 
Houlié and Pillet for the Commission mixte paritaire – Report no 
352 (2017-2018)). The Ordonnance was ratified by the Act no 
2018-287 of 20 April 2018. 
So what did motivate the introduction of a provision 
allowing judicial review of contracts? Was it policy or 
commercial considerations? Is the new Article 1195 CC only 
an evolution in the footsteps of other European domestic rules 
and transnational legal principles or a response to commercial 
needs? Does this erode the principle of pacta sunt servanda and 
herald a more radical judicial approach to unforeseeability? 
History traces the theory of imprévision back to the 12th and 
13th centuries in the Roman rule – contractus qui habent tractum 
successivum et depentiam de future rebus sic stantibus intelliguntur 
– that set limits to contractual sanctity because of economic 
instability. Its implementation led to commercial uncertainty 
that reduced its popularity. With the rise of scientific positivism 
and the philosophy of Enlightenment cherishing the freedom 
of contract, the Napoleonic code did not incorporate any 
provisions on unforeseeability. Over time, the French courts 
continued to reject the theory of imprévision as they upheld the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda strictly.
This theory raises the questions whether an unforeseeable 
change of circumstances that renders the performance of the 
contracts commercially impracticable may be considered as an 
excuse to non-performance, and what remedies are available 
to the parties. It mainly applies to commercial contracts, 
particularly instalment contracts whose performance consists 
of performance of repeated actions over a period of time 
and long-term contracts. These commercial contracts are 
the focus of this paper. As businesses negotiate the terms of 
their contract, they are expected not only to consider the 
existing circumstances but also to anticipate the circumstances 
that might affect the performance in the longer term. The 
contract therefore becomes an exercise of foreseeability. This is 
consistent with the doctrinal theory of imprévision that focuses 
on the unforeseeability of the event itself rather than its economic 
effects. 
The new Article 1195 CC reflects the influence of other 
European country responses to unforeseen circumstances, 
including the German Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage or the Italian 
eccessiva onerosità sopravvenuta, and international legal projects, 
such as the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) 
and the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (Unidroit Principles). The Rapport au Président de la 
République (Report to the President of the Republic relating 
to the Ordonnance no 2016-131 of 10 February 2016) in its 
explanatory notes on Article 1195 CC stresses the importance 
of the European context as part of the justification for the 
reform:
France is one of the last European countries not to recognise the 
theory of imprévision as a moderating factor to the binding force 
of contract. Its enshrinement inspired by comparative law as well 
as European harmonisation projects makes it possible to combat 
major contractual imbalances arising during performance, in 
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accordance with the objective of contractual fairness sought by 
the Ordonnance.
These notes explain the objective of the theory of imprévision, 
which is to balance the principle of pacta sunt servanda, 
promoting the security of transactions, and contractual 
fairness. More importantly, the reform has a utilitarian 
dimension, which aims to keep the contract alive where it still 
has an economic and perhaps social role to play (Mekki and 
Kloepfer Pelese, “Hardship and Modification (or Revision) 
of the Contract (2010)”, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1542511. 
The reform is also a response to concerns of small and 
medium sized businesses about the absence of default rules 
on hardship in the Civil Code, which is more problematic 
for a sector where contracts tend to be less complete. This 
contrasts with larger companies that carefully insert detailed 
hardship provisions, dealing with matters such as material 
adverse change or price adjustment mechanisms, in their more 
complete contracts. 
In light of these considerations, the Ordonnance now 
enshrines the theory of imprévision with some specificities. 
Article 1195 CC is concerned with adjusting the rights of two 
innocent parties – on the one hand, the right of the affected 
party that must continue to perform but needs a way out from 
a situation of commercial impracticability, and on the other 
hand, the right of the other party entitled to the performance 
of the contract. As the parties are better placed to understand 
their respective position in the transaction and make decisions, 
the preferred mode of resolution envisaged in the first 
paragraph of 1195 CC is   renegotiation. When this fails, the 
next port of call – and ultimate one – is the court. The novelty 
of the article lies in the power of the court to adjust the terms 
of the contract or bring it to an end. The court now appears to 
have a greater degree of discretion to review the contract. This 
raises the usual questions about the conditions under which 
this can be exercised and the resulting effects. 
As this paper shows, Article 1195 CC raises three paradoxes:
 - the first one in the nature of the article itself as a default rule 
that encourages a voluntary ex-ante contractual solution over 
a judicial solution through careful pre-emptive drafting;
 - The second at the renegotiation phase as the affected party 
has the right to request renegotiation whereas the other 
contracting party the right to refuse to renegotiate; and
 - The third in the new judicial powers that play as a deterrent 
and favour an ex-post contractual solution through 
renegotiation.
Overall, this article demonstrates a clear bias for a private 
contractual and negotiated solution (over a judicial one). Small 
and medium sized businesses are likely to avail themselves of the 
new framework to redefine their contractual relationship. By 
contrast, larger commercial enterprises are further incentivised 
to enhance their self-reliance by boosting forward-looking 
contractual and expert determination provisions dealing with 
changed circumstances. In the words of the rapporteur for the 
Senate, “(t)he hypothesis where the judge will be asked by a 
party to review the contract will remain theoretical” (Pillet, in 
the report prepared by the Commission mixte paritaire –Report 
no 352 (2017-2018)). The fear of a snowball effect with the 
provision generating a a more interventionist judicial attitude 
appears exaggerated.
To understand Article 1195 CC and the new power of the 
courts to review the contract, it is necessary to explore (1) the 
context and particularly the judicial approach to hardship in 
commercial contracts overtime until the recent Ordonnance, 
(2) the conditions for the exercise and effects of the new 
provision on imprévision, and (3) the perspectives this article 
opens up in the case of chain or group of contracts. 
A CALL FOR REFORM 
Until the reform enshrined in the Ordonnance, commercial 
impracticability could not be invoked as an excuse for non-
performance on the ground of the principle pacta sunt 
servanda. Despite the rigour of this constant rejection, courts 
nevertheless gradually ascertained the existence of an obligation 
to renegotiate on the basis of the principle of good faith. The 
conditions of application of this new obligation had remained 
however unclear as case law shows, thus calling for legislative 
clarification. 
The consistent rejection of the theory of imprévision 
The judicial rejection of the theory of imprévision can 
be traced back to the seminal decision of Canal de Craponne 
(Civ. 6 Mach 1876, DP 1876. 1. 193). In that case, the Cour 
de cassation refused to increase the fees that landowners had 
to pay in exchange for the maintenance and operation of the 
canal that were set more than three centuries ago despite an 
increase by more than 400 per cent of the actual costs. It based 
its decision on the principle of pacta sunt servanda enshrined 
in the former Article 1134 CC that provided that agreements 
lawfully formed have the force of law for those who have made them. 
As a result, it firmly prohibited courts from considering time 
and circumstances to adjust the terms of the contract, however 
equitable their decisions might appear. In successive cases, the 
Cour de cassation systematically quashed any such consideration 
of equity by lower courts to increase the contract price in light 
of the changed circumstances. As such, it embraced a strict 
interpretation of the intangibility of contracts, even where 
the performance of the contract had become commercially 
impracticable. The rigour of the solution was aimed at 
reinforcing the legal certainty ascribed to the contracts. Only 
a few cases have actually come to the attention of the Cour de 
Cassation; clearly not enough for this court to give up the well-
anchored rejection of the theory of imprévision and any judicial 
intervention in the contract. A few variants have however 
emerged over time. 
A gradual emergence of a duty to renegotiate in good faith
In a couple of cases in the 1990s (Com. 3 November 1992, 
Huard, no 90-18.547, Bull. civ. IV, no 338; Com. 24 November 
1998, Chevassus-Marche, no 96-18.357, Bull. civ. IV, no 277), the 
Cour de cassation ascertained an obligation to renegotiate based 
on the principle of good faith in circumstances of commercial 
impracticability. In these cases, the court acknowledged 
that the party claiming hardship, ie the distributor or the 
commercial agent, had been deprived of the ability of 
charging competitive prices due to the changed circumstances 
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and their state of economic dependency. The continuing 
participation of the parties in the market was threatened by 
the intangibility of the seriously imbalanced contract and 
justified a renegotiation of the terms of the contract by the 
party benefitting from the circumstances In another decision 
of 2007 (CA Nancy 26 September 2007, D. 2008.1120), the 
Court of Appeal of Nancy expanded the scope of application 
of the obligation to renegotiate in a supply contract on the 
legal basis of good faith performance. The introduction of 
a new legislation for the reduction of greenhouse gases had 
caused a significant disequilibrium in the contract against the 
economic interest of the supply company that justified such 
obligation. The generality of the obligation to renegotiate was 
however questioned since all the cases examined related to the 
distribution industry.
In the context of an international sales contract subject 
to the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (CISG) (1980), the issue of hardship has come 
up too. Whereas it is well-established that Article 79 CISG 
provides an excuse for a failure to perform any obligations in 
case of impossibility, domestic courts have to decide if it also 
applies in case of commercial impracticability. The now well-
known case Scafom International BV v Lorraine Tubes SAS (Belgian 
C. Cass, 19 June 2009, C.07.0289.N, available at http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/090619b1.html) confirmed the existence 
of an obligation to renegotiate in good faith; it also showed the 
confusion of the courts when faced with a dispute on hardship. 
This case related to a number of contracts of sale between a 
Dutch buyer and a French seller for the delivery of steel tubes 
in Belgium. Following the increase in the price of steel by 70 
per cent, the seller tried to renegotiate a higher contract price 
but in vain as the buyer refused and requested delivery of the 
goods at the contract price. The lower Commercial Court of 
Tongeren highlighted the failure of the parties to insert a clause 
in their contract for price adjustment and confirmed in line 
with French case law that “in the absence of such provisions, it 
was for the buyer to bear the risk of non-performance without 
being able to benefit from the provisions of Article 79 CISG…” 
(Civ 30 June 2004, RTDC 2004.845, obs Delebecque). The 
Court of Appeal of Antwerp overturned the lower court’s 
decision and, applying French law, held that the buyer had an 
obligation to renegotiate the terms of the contracts. Finally, 
the Belgian Cour de cassation rejected the application of French 
law. That said, it reached the same conclusion as the Court of 
Appeal and confirmed the obligation of the buyer to renegotiate 
the contracts (in good faith) as the unforeseen price increase 
gave rise to a “serious disequilibrium (in the obligations of 
the parties) that rendered the subsequent performance of the 
contract in the same conditions particularly detrimental (to the 
seller).” It based its decision on the Unidroit Principles as the 
general principles of international trade law that can be used 
to fill the gaps in the CISG in a uniform manner. Paradoxically, 
it confirmed that Article 79 CISG could, in certain cases, 
cover cases of hardship as changed circumstances that were 
not reasonably foreseeable at the time of conclusion of the 
contract and were unequivocally of a nature to increase the 
burden of performance of the contract in a disproportionate 
manner could constitute an “impediment.”
 A case of judicial confusion?
A succession of cases thereafter showed the confusion of the 
Cour de cassation in its quest for a legal doctrine that could  ground 
the theory of imprévision and justify an obligation to renegotiate 
–  either on the basis of  “cause” (Com. 29 June 2010, no 
09-67.369; Com 17 February 2015, no 12-29550), , or more 
recently on the basis of a duty of loyalty between the franchisor 
and franchisee (Com. 15 March 2017, no  15-16.406), or even 
the principle of good faith, as already mentioned. In passing it 
should be noted that the concept of “cause” has been removed 
from the rewritten law of obligations. Nevertheless, against the 
emergence of a contractual and amicable solution, the Cour 
de cassation re-asserted that courts did not have the power to 
adjust the terms of the contract (Civ 3e, 18 March 2009, No 
07-21.260).
Another case – Dupire Invicta Industrie (D21) v Gabo (Com. 
17 February 2015, no 12-29.550, 13-18.956 and 13-20.230) 
– once again considered the excuse of hardship in international 
sales. It related to a contract of sale between a French seller 
and a Polish buyer for the delivery of heating units. The 
buyer was also the seller’s exclusive distributor in Poland and 
Slovakia. The sale contract was governed by Polish law and did 
not contain a hardship clause as commonly done in the trade 
for these specific goods. Following an increase in the market 
price of raw materials, the seller refused to deliver the goods 
at the contract price invoking a case of hardship. As a result, 
the buyer sought compensation for the actual loss and loss of 
profit, as well as the payment of a penalty for late delivery as 
provided for in the contract.
The Commercial Court of Sedan denied the seller’s 
contention that it was entitled to withhold performance, even 
in a case of hardship. The Court of Appeal of Reims (Reims, 
4 September 2012, no  11/02698) also refused to grant any 
relief to the seller as it had failed to produce evidence that the 
price increase it suffered satisfied the requirements of hardship 
and, that even if he had suffered losses, the Unidroit Principles 
did not authorise the affected party to suspend performance. 
It held that the CISG did not exclude hardship, and that the 
Unidroit Principles could be used to interpret and supplement 
the CISG. It added that the seller had not demonstrated that 
the buyer had violated the principle of good faith when it 
had failed to renegotiate the price or postponed meetings to 
discuss the situation. 
In its decision of 17 February 2015 (Com. 17 February 
2015, no  12-29550, 13-18956, and 13-20230), the Cour de 
cassation held that the Court of Appeal had failed to ascertain 
whether the price fluctuations exceeded normal variations in 
the relevant marketplace and changed the additional burden 
on the seller into an excusable hardship, thus depriving its 
decision of a legal basis under the former Articles 1131 CC 
(“An obligation without a cause or with a false cause or with 
an unlawful cause cannot have any effect”) and 1134 CC 
(“Agreements lawfully formed have the force of law for those 
who have made them. They may be revoked only by their 
mutual consent, or on grounds which legislation authorises”. 
(…)), and Article 6.2.1 of the Unidroit Principles (“Where 
the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one 
of the parties, that party is nevertheless bound to perform its 
obligations subject to the following provisions on hardship.”) 
Nevertheless, it upheld the appellate decision on this point 
as the seller failed to prove that the increase in the cost of 
performance of its contractual obligations, or the new situation 
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that profoundly altered the balance of the contract, constituted 
a case of hardship. It also implicitly adopted the conclusions of 
the Court of Appeal that hardship falls within the CISG and that 
the Unidroit Principles define the scope and consequences of 
hardship. On the renvoi, the Court of Appeal of Nancy (Nancy, 
14 March 2018, no 15/01554) confirmed the decision of the 
Commercial Court of Sedan on hardship, and rejected all the 
claims made by the two parties. Even in international sales, 
these cases show the difficulty for the courts in determining 
hardship.
Lessons to be drawn from these cases
These cases highlight a few interesting points. The first one 
is the confirmation from the Scafom and D21 international sales 
cases that the Cour de cassation is of the opinion that the CISG 
covers hardship, and that the Unidroit Principles can be used 
to interpret and supplement the CISG, particularly in a case 
of hardship. With the introduction of the theory of imprévision 
into the law of contract, there is now a risk of discrepancy in 
the application of the rules relating to hardship in domestic 
and international sales contracts. Such discrepancy may 
however be mitigated if the new Article 1195 CC is read itself 
in light of the Unidroit Principles, something that needs to be 
kept in mind. In any case, a contractual term can always set 
aside Article 79 CISG as well as Article 1195 CC. The second 
point relates to the emergence of an obligation to renegotiate 
in changed circumstances. This obligation is the precursor to 
the new right to request renegotiation in Article 1195 CC. 
It is very much in the spirit of settling the dispute through 
conciliation. Paradoxically, there is no obligation that the 
renegotiation leads to a common solution, even pursuant to 
the principle of good faith. As acknowledged in D21, a failure 
to renegotiate the price or the postponement of meetings to 
discuss the situation does not amount to a breach of good faith. 
This is consistent with previous decisions (Com. 3 October 
2006, D.2007, at 765-770) that in the absence of abusive 
behaviour, the party that refuses to modify the terms of the 
contract does not attract liability. The limits to renegotiation 
are clear - if and when renegotiation fails, the next port of call 
remains the court. This leads to the third point that shows 
the traditional consistency of the Cour de cassation that always 
refused to adjust the terms of the contract in a case of hardship 
on the ground of pacta sunt servanda. 
In the wake of these cases, and a growing sense of confusion, 
a legislative framework was therefore expected. It is now done 
following the Ordonnance as the new Article 1195 CC enshrines 
the theory of imprévision in the Civil code.
THE PARADOXES OF THE (NEW) THEORY OF 
IMPREVISION
Except in rare cases where statutes were enacted to address 
specific economic circumstances had the French legislator ever 
allowed judicial adjustment of contracts. Examples of these 
instances are the Act of 21 Jan 1918 (Loi Failliot) (supplemented 
by the Act of 9 May 1920) and the Act of 23 April 1949 
that provided for the termination of commercial contracts 
concluded before the beginning of the two World Wars, and the 
circular no  90-72 of 18 October 1990 that admitted imprévision 
in the context of the Gulf War if one of the parties suffered a 
prejudice exceeding the reasonable expectations at the date of 
conclusion of the contract. In a (radical) move, the Chancellerie 
has now granted (ultimate) powers of review to the courts in 
case of changed circumstances when parties have exhausted 
means of conciliation. It is one of the most striking novelties of 
the reform. It is however interesting to note that French law is 
already familiar with the well-established theory of imprévision 
in administrative law (Compagnie générale d’éclairage de 
Bordeaux, CE, 30 March 1916, Rec. 125). It also follows in 
the footsteps of the recent Article L 441-8 of the Commercial 
Code that requires that a “clause relating to the terms of 
renegotiation of the price” be inserted in contracts  of sales of 
products whose “costs of production are significantly affected 
by the fluctuations of prices of agricultural commodities and 
food products” (see Pédamon, The New French Contract Law 
and its Impact on Commercial Law, in Heidemann and Lee 
(eds) The Future of the Commercial Contract in Scholarship and Law 
Reform: European and Comparative Perspectives, (Springer, 2018)). 
Article 1195 CC is contained in sub-section 1 on the binding 
force (of contract) that is part of section 1 on the effects of 
contract between the parties, itself in Chapter IV on the Effects 
of Contract. Article 1195 CC deals with the effects of hardship, 
but is silent as to whether it is an exception to the binding 
force principle. Is the new provision an exception, or simply 
a “moderating factor”, as claimed in the Rapport au Président? 
Regardless of which it is, the juxtaposition of the binding force 
principle with the unforeseeability paradoxically reinforces 
the primary rule. By contrast, the equivalent provision in 
the PECL and Unidroit Principles is written as an exception. 
More substantively, the aim of this article, as expressly stated in 
the Rapport au Président de la Republique, is to “play a preventive 
role: the risk of destruction or adjustment of the contract by 
the court should encourage the parties to negotiate.” It could 
not be clearer – in its activism for a conciliatory solution, the 
legislative focus is on the renegotiation of the contractual terms 
by the parties. This is consistent with the spirit of the overall 
reform, which empowers the parties to avoid litigation or settle 
the dispute without judicial interference. 
Article 1195 CC is furthermore a default rule that is 
commonly set aside in sophisticated and complex commercial 
contracts that provide for hardship terms or indexation clauses, 
thus leaving the applicability of this article mainly to smaller 
commercial contracts as well as standard and non-commercial 
contracts. A distinction must be drawn between voluntary 
or anticipated renegotiation and involuntary renegotiation 
(Pédamon & Chuah, Hardship in Transnational Commercial 
Contracts, (2013), p 86). A hardship term commonly provides 
for renegotiation if and when certain defined or undefined 
events occur. As it has been contractually negotiated, the 
renegotiation is voluntary. By contrast, where there is no 
such clause in the contract, the statutory right to call for a 
renegotiation leads to involuntary renegotiation. Only with the 
threat of judicial review will this type of renegotiation succeed. 
Article 1195 CC provides as follows: 
If a change of circumstances that was unforeseeable at the time of 
conclusion of the contract renders performance excessively onerous 
for a party who had not agreed to bear the risk of such a change, 
that party may ask the other contracting party to renegotiate the 
contract. This party must continue to perform her obligations 
during the renegotiation.
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In the case of refusal or failure of renegotiation, the parties 
may agree to terminate the contract from the date and on the 
conditions which they determine, or ask the court, by a common 
agreement, to set about its adjustment. In the absence of 
agreement within a reasonable time, the court may, upon request 
of one party, adjust the contract or put an end to it, from a date 
and subject to such conditions as it shall determine.
The conditions of application of this new article and its 
effects must be considered.
 A limited application due to stringent conditions
Several conditions must be met before any effect can be 
produced – the first one relates to the unforeseeable change 
of circumstances at the time of conclusion of the contract; the 
second one implies that the risk of changed circumstances has 
not been allocated to the party who is affected by the change, 
that is for the most part the seller; and the third one relates to 
the financial excessive performance of the contract.
An unforeseeable change of circumstances at the time of 
conclusion of the contract
The broad formulation of Article 1195 CC covers all 
kinds of changed circumstances – from a legal event, such 
as the introduction of a new legislation to an economic or 
financial one relating to a market fluctuation or bankruptcy 
or an environmental disaster. It is assessed against a test 
of unforeseeability that relates to the occurrence of the 
event itself as well as its scale (Deshayes, Genicon, Laithier, 
Réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des 
obligations, Commentary, LexisNexis, 2016, p 393). Although 
not explicitly stated, the test of unforeseeability is objective in 
the sense that it requires that the affected party proves that a 
reasonable party in the same circumstances would not have 
foreseen the changed circumstances. It is commonly read in 
accordance with Article 1218 CC that defines force majeure 
as “an event beyond the control of the debtor, which could 
not reasonably have been foreseen at the time of conclusion 
of the contract (and whose effects could not be avoided by 
appropriate measures…)” despite the (unfortunate) difference 
in formulation (see Chantepie & Latina, Le nouveau droit des 
obligations, (Dalloz, 2nd ed) no 524, p 474).  This analysis 
is consistent with the approach already adopted by the Cour 
de cassation despite the absence of the adverb “reasonably” 
qualifying “unforeseeable” in Article 1195 CC. The reasonable 
unforeseeability of changed circumstance must be assessed 
at the time of conclusion of the contract. In D21 v Gabo, 
previously discussed, the Cour de cassation criticised the Court 
of Appeal as it did not consider if the increase in costs of raw 
materials amounted to abnormal fluctuations in the relevant 
market. 
Given the absence of clear standards and the imprecision 
of the notion, the test of unforeseeability leaves a rather wide 
margin of appreciation to the court, particularly as the 
market and relevant commercial practices evolve and become 
complex. How will the courts decide whether the changed 
circumstances – ie a labour shortage or an increased cost of 
production due to Brexit - fall within the ordinary range of 
commercial probability? 
A risk of change that has not been allocated to the party who 
is affected by the change
The allocation of risks must be assessed as at the time of 
conclusion of the contract; it requires that courts ascertain 
the contemporaneous intention of the parties pursuant to the 
principles of contractual interpretation. These risks may not 
necessarily be expressly allocated in the contract; they may 
follow implicitly from the nature of the contract itself or by 
implication from the absence of any contractual provision. In 
a case of 2004 (Civ. 30 June 2004, RTDC 2004.845), the Cour 
de cassation held that:
as a professional who is familiar with the practices of international 
trade, it was for the buyer to provide contractual mechanisms 
of guarantee or revision of contract. (…) (I)n the absence of 
such provisions, it was for the buyer to bear the risk of non-
performance without being able to benefit from the provisions of 
Article 79 CISG (…).
If that party bears the risk, it has to support the losses due 
to the changed circumstances.
Underlying this condition is the assumption that the 
parties are in a better position to make decisions about the 
risks associated with their transactions. Professor Gillette in 
“Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term 
Contracts” (69 Minn L Rev 521, 524 (1985)) argues that even if 
parties cannot foretell the future accurately, they can anticipate 
the existence of uncertainty and rationally provide mechanisms 
to estimate and control the consequences. His view is that 
rational planners tend to eliminate those risks at a cost less 
than their perceived cost. The presumption of completeness 
can however be rebutted if evidence of incomplete contracting 
is established. Parties can be prevented from writing complete 
contracts if the cost of actually negotiating the contracting 
terms is high – higher than the perceived cost of the risk itself. 
The function of contract law is therefore to provide default 
terms that a majority of parties would have chosen, thus 
reducing the cost of contracting ex ante. To what extent is it the 
case with respect to Article 1195 CC? This must be answered 
when considering the effects of the new legal provision.
It should be noted that, as a compromise negotiated by the 
senators during the parliamentary debates for the ratification 
of the Ordonnance, a new provision – Article L 211-40-1 of 
the Monetary and Financial Code – was adopted that excludes 
from the scope of application of Article 1195 CC, the promises 
arising from securities transactions and financial contracts (Art 
L. 211-1 I-III of this (same) code). These contracts escape 
the new statutory provision because of their speculative nature.
The excessive financial burden of performance
The formulation of Article 1195 CC reproduces Article 
6:111 of the PECL that requires an “excessively onerous” 
performance that may be the result of an increase or diminution 
in cost; it is a formulation centred on the economic value of 
the performance due. How excessive should the performance 
have become to be excused, in other words, how significant 
should the financial losses be? As there is no set test to assess 
the excessive financial burden, lower courts can exercise 
their discretion in their consideration of the relevant factors. 
Furthermore, these considerations are matters of fact that 
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escape any control from the Cour de cassation. The vagueness 
of the criteria is problematic as it may lead to unpredictable 
outcomes, but from the cases already discussed, courts have 
been inclined to avoid assessing the financial losses. Additional 
questions remain unanswered, such as whether the undue 
financial burden can cover the loss of profits. Such uncertainties 
are an incentive for the parties to find a contractual solution.
A formulation closer to Article 6.2.2 in the Unidroit 
Principles would have been preferable as it refers to a 
fundamental alteration of the equilibrium in the contract either 
because the cost of a party’s performance has increased or 
because the value of the performance a party receives has 
diminished. It sets an objective test anchored in the contract 
itself as it consists of assessing the equilibrium as originally 
agreed upon in the contract compared with the disequilibrium 
caused by the unforeseen circumstances. As held by the Belgian 
Cour de cassation in the Scafom case, the unforeseen price increase 
had given rise to a “serious disequilibrium (in the obligations of 
the parties) that rendered the subsequent performance of the 
contract in the same conditions particularly detrimental (to the 
seller).” The disequilibrium raises the question as to what the 
effect of this should be contractually.
The effects of imprévision – the bias for a contractual 
solution 
The novelty of Article 1195 CC lies in the effects of the 
imprévision in terms of remedies available to the parties – either 
to find a common contractual solution further to (involuntary) 
renegotiation or to request by common agreement or 
unilaterally that the judge finds the appropriate remedy – 
by either adjusting the terms of the contract or avoiding the 
contract itself. Although the court may decide to keep the 
contract as is, it is quite unlikely since the excessive financial 
burden calls for a solution. 
The right to request renegotiation 
Once the conditions of hardship are met, the first remedy 
now available is the right for the party to call for a renegotiation 
of the contract. Such request may be accepted or refused (as 
indicated in the following sentence of Article 1195 CC – ie 
in the case of rejection or failure of renegotiation). Was 
legal permission necessary to grant this right as Article 1195 
CC only provides for the ability to request renegotiation? 
Paradoxically it even departs from previous case law that had 
asserted an obligation to renegotiate in good faith. Underlying 
this provision is the idea that parties are willing to overcome 
together a situation of hardship and work out a solution to 
save their contractual relationship and avoid economic waste. 
During the phase of renegotiation, performance of the contract 
must continue. Does it imply a contrario that the affected party 
is entitled to suspend performance when the renegotiation 
stops or the other party refuses to renegotiate? Courts are 
likely to consider this remedy in light of the circumstances and 
against good faith. 
Even if good faith permeates the whole life of the contract 
(as stated in the new Art 1104 CC – (“Contracts must be 
negotiated, formed and performed in good faith” (…)), courts 
have however traditionally narrowly interpreted the obligation 
to renegotiate in good faith. There is no obligation to reach an 
agreement so long as the parties do not act contrary to good 
faith. As seen in D21, a failure to renegotiate the price or the 
postponement of meeting to discuss the situation does not 
amount to bad faith. Article 2.1.15 of the Unidroit Principles 
defines negotiations in bad faith in case where a party enters 
into or continues negotiations when intending not to reach an 
agreement with the other party; bad faith may consist of actual 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure of facts that should have 
been disclosed. It goes beyond foot dragging or even walking 
away.
More surprisingly is indeed the ability of the party who 
benefits from the unforeseeable changed circumstances to 
refuse to renegotiate. Refusing (involuntary) renegotiation is 
a right and does not amount to a breach of good faith. It is 
another paradox of Article 1195 CC given that renegotiation 
is the option pushed by the legislator to avoid unnecessary 
economic waste, but it is also a more realistic understanding 
of the commercial reality. What is the point to force a party to 
attend renegotiations against its will? The refusal to renegotiate 
must however be understood against the other remedies now 
available to the affected party, particularly the ability of the 
party to request the judge to review the contract or put an end 
to it. As a result, the beneficiary of the changed circumstances 
would lose its ability to bargain, and, in the worst-case scenario, 
the benefit of the contract itself. There is potential for double 
disadvantage for the party benefitting from the changed 
circumstances: loss of the ability to demand performance on 
favourable terms and need to supply itself in an altered (more 
expensive) market. This party is arguably penalised for having 
planned and contracted its original bargain carefully. (This 
disadvantage is nonetheless mitigated by incentives within the 
provision which re-balance the rights of both parties. Article 
1195 CC operates a double set of incentives. The incentive 
for the benefitting party to maintain as much of the economic 
advantage as possible and therefore to renegotiate against the 
threat of a judicial intervention. In parallel, the incentive for 
the suffering party to settle the matter quickly since it must 
continue to perform its obligations during the renegotiation 
and may only request a court to review the contract in the 
absence of agreement within a reasonable time. The obligation to 
continue to perform is aimed at defeating opportunistic tactics 
from the affected party. Paradoxically it could be used by 
the benefitting party to drag out the renegotiations, but this 
could amount to a breach of good faith pursuant to Article 
1112 CC (“The beginning, continuation and breaking-off of 
pre-contractual negotiations are free. They must mandatorily 
meet the requirements of good faith”) by analogy.  Additionally, 
by failing or refusing to renegotiate the advantaged party may 
commit a breach that leaves it exposed to liability pursuant to 
Article 1112 CC. This article provides however that “(i)n case 
of fault during the negotiations, the reparation of the resulting 
loss may not compensate either the loss of benefits expected 
from the contract or the loss of the chance of obtaining these 
benefits.”
Article 1195 CC implies that the affected party has 
approached the other party to renegotiate the contract, at 
least as a pre-condition to lodging a claim. In practice, in light 
of previous case law, this is what happens, and what should 
happen.
The next step to the phase of renegotiation that has failed or 
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been refused is the ability of the parties by common agreement 
to terminate the contract. This is a manifestation of mutuus 
dissensus, as already expressed in Article 1193 CC (“Contracts 
can only be modified or revoked by the parties’ mutual consent 
or on grounds which legislation authorises.”) Termination 
occurs in an amicable fashion (résolution amiable). The 
concept used in French to refer to this mode of termination 
(résolution) is surprising given that termination can be agreed 
upon without any breach of performance (Chantepie & Latina, 
Le nouveau droit des obligations, (Dalloz, 2nd ed) no 529, p 480). 
How realistic is this option since the renegotiation has failed 
showing the unwillingness of parties to accommodate each 
other’s interests? It is even more unrealistic to expect that 
the parties jointly “ask the court to adjust the terms of the 
contract.” 
Judicial review of the contract – the choice between 
adjustment and termination
This judicial solution – the solution of last resort - is the one 
that gives rise to much controversy, as it legalises the judicial 
review of the contract in a case of changed circumstances. 
Any fear of excessive judicial interference in the contract is 
however ungrounded. The paradox that emerges here lies in 
the deterrent effect of the judicial option as parties are now 
encouraged to work out a contractual solution. As such, this 
article reinforces the binding effect of the free will of the 
parties. 
Where the renegotiation fails or the other party refuses to 
re-negotiate, the parties may jointly request the judge to adjust 
the terms of the contract. How likely is this judicial voluntary 
adjustment in a commercial context? Given that it is so unlikely, 
the practical consequence of this option is for the parties to 
reach agreement between themselves at an earlier stage. More 
relevant, is the ability of one party – any party? – to request 
the judge to adjust the terms of the contract or terminate it in 
the absence of agreement within a reasonable time. This is the 
novelty so much expected, and de facto so limited.
The judicial power is very much framed as a recourse of 
last resort. The threat of judicial review plays as a deterrent 
for the party that has an interest in keeping the contract in 
force to find a renegotiated solution. Although it is phrased 
quite unclearly, the purpose of this provision is to request 
that the affected party engage first with the other party for a 
renegotiation before going to court. The other party may refuse 
and go to court instead, so what can the judge do?
The judge has a choice between adjusting the terms of the 
contract or bringing it to an end “from a date and subject to 
such conditions as it shall determine”.  There is no hierarchy 
between these remedies. The choice depends on the claim of 
the party. Can the judge impose an adjustment of the terms if 
the party has lodged a claim for termination, or vice versa? (T 
Revet, Le juge et la révision du contrat, RDC 2016, no 16). The 
civil procedure rules appear to prohibit this. The judge may in 
fact exercise greater discretion if the claim made by one party 
is contested by the other party since under this scenario the 
judge will have to make a decision for the parties.  In such a 
case, the court may consider the parties’ intention as expressed 
in the terms of the contract, the circumstances at the time of 
conclusion of the contract, and, as suggested in Article 92 of 
the projet Terré, the legitimate expectations of the parties, together 
with the usage and practice of the market. The distinction 
between adjustment and termination may not be so easy to 
draw in practice.
It is striking how difficult it might be for the court to adjust 
the terms of the contract. How can the parties’ mutual practices 
in long-term contracts be discerned as they evolve and develop 
over a period of time? Which are relevant? However, courts are 
already familiar with the practice of adjusting the terms of the 
contract in other circumstances defined by the legislator. For 
instance, pursuant to Article 1231-5 CC, the judge may, even at 
her/his initiative, adjust the terms of contractual performance 
by moderating or increasing a contractually agreed penalty if 
it is manifestly excessive or derisory, or, pursuant to Article 
1343-5 CC, defer payment of sums that are due or allow 
payment in instalments. A straightforward way of adjusting the 
terms of the contract will be for the court to modify the price 
in light of the indexes or other formulae extracted from the 
relevant market. An expert or any other neutral third party 
may be involved in the process of determining the appropriate 
adjustment terms. Other types of adjustment – at least in theory 
– may be considered as the term “revision” is broad; it can 
consist of reviewing the terms of delivery, the quantity of the 
goods, or any other contractual terms. Termination is the other 
option available to the judge. To do so may defeat the objective 
pursued in Article 1195 CC that is to avoid economic waste 
by forcing the parties to renegotiate the terms of the contract. 
However, there might be circumstances where adjustment is 
impossible for economic or opportunistic reasons.
Overall, the solution will depend on the (economic) 
benefits for one party to save the relationship and renegotiate 
the terms of the contract, or even on their common decision 
to terminate the agreement. Parties in an ongoing long-
term relationship – the usual situation here – have a strong 
incentive to work out disagreements amicably rather than see 
the relationship destroyed by litigation. Through this lens, the 
(new) power of judicial review is limited, another paradox of 
Article 1195 CC. As a default provision, it rather encourages 
the parties to include in their contracts ex ante price variation 
clauses defining the parameters and mechanism for adjusting 
prices in cases of sudden and unexpected market fluctuations. 
Even if this inevitably adds up to the cost of contracting – ie 
the front-end costs – it may also save the cost of litigation or 
arbitration – ie back end costs. In practice, long-term contracts 
and complex transactions commonly include highly detailed 
provisions relating to hardship. However, even in this case, the 
notions used and the dispute resolution mechanisms in place 
can be imprecise. In the context of changed circumstances, the 
contractual relationship tends to become adversarial as each 
party focuses on the short-term and its own partisan interests. 
The new article can create an incentive for the parties to refer 
the adjustment of their contract to a (neutral) third party well 
versed in their markets, or even private arbitrators. 
The absence of such contractual provision can be held 
against the affected party, as seen in previous cases. As a point 
of attention, it must be noted that a waiver in a standard form 
contract that would be non-negotiable and determined in 
advance by one party and would cause a significant imbalance 
in the rights and obligations of the parties, may be deemed 
not written pursuant to Article 1171 CC. Careful drafting is 
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therefore required. 
NEW PERSPECTIVES – THE EFFECTS OF 
IMPREVISION ON OTHER CONTRACTS
Another aspect of this new provision that must be considered 
is how the theory of imprévision will have a knock-on effect 
for other contracts in a vertical chain or transactional group. 
It raises an issue of allocation of risks. Whereas the facts are 
quite similar in the case of a chain or group of contracts, their 
legal consequences are different. In both cases, the economic 
consequences can be significant. Special care will be needed 
to ensure consistent application of Article 1195 CC across the 
group or chain of contracts. There may also be timing issues if 
Article 1195 CC is invoked sequentially. 
Imprévision in a group or chain of contracts – Article 1195 
CC
As already discussed, Article 1195 CC implicitly requires that 
the affected party request a renegotiation before approaching 
the court. In theory, however, the party who benefits from the 
changed circumstances has no obligation to renegotiate, but in 
practice its conduct will be assessed against standards of good 
faith (See Com. 15 March 2017, no 15-16.406 for the liability 
of a franchisor who refused to renegotiate). It is likely that 
courts will be more robust with parties to groups or chains 
of contracts by forcing them to renegotiate because of the 
higher economic stakes. Although Article 1195 CC does not 
force the benefiting party to come to the table, the principle 
of good faith can be deployed by the court to bring pressure 
to bear on reluctant negotiators. If, as provided for in Article 
1195 CC, the court is asked to intervene, it is likely that it 
will consider the economic operation as a whole and also 
the interdependence between the contracts, to understand 
the effects of imprévision and the remedies available. It may 
decide to adjust or terminate the contract. Termination can 
have serious economic consequences on the other contracts. 
One can imagine the courts exercising their powers of review 
with even greater caution in these scenarios? (Fauvarque-
Cosson, “Does Review on the Ground of Imprévision Breach 
the Principle of the Binding Force of Contracts”, in Cartwright 
and Whittaker (eds) The Code Napoléon Rewritten, (Hart, 2018), 
p 201). 
Imprévision in a group of contracts – Article 1186 & 1187 
CC
Article 1186 CC adopts a unique solution for groups of 
contracts. It provides for the lapse (caducité) of contracts whose 
performance is rendered impossible by the disappearance of 
one of them. It is consistent with the first paragraph of Article 
1186 CC that states: “(a) contract which has been validly 
formed lapses if one of its essential elements disappears.” 
This article enshrines the legal notion of group of contracts 
(ensemble contractuel), a concept previously developed by 
case law. What matters in the definition is to establish the link 
of indivisibility (lien d’indivisibilité) between the contracts. 
This link can be an express term in the contracts or implied 
from the facts, particularly in light of the coherence of the 
contractual group that contributes to the same economic 
operation (Chantepie & Latina, Le nouveau droit des obligations, 
(Dalloz, 2nd ed) no 495, p 441). 
Although the effect of lapse is significant, it is justified since 
the performance of the other contract has become impossible. 
Lapse is however a remedy only if the party against whom it 
is held knew of the existence of the contractual group when it 
gave its consent.
 Article 1187 CC furthermore provides that the lapse 
brings an end to the contract and may give rise to restitution 
as set out in Articles 1352 to 1352-9 CC. In that sense, it 
differs from the appreciation of hardship as the disappearance 
of an essential element automatically causes its lapse that the 
judge (or the parties) must uphold. Restitution triggers other 
considerations in its application by the courts that go beyond 
this paper.
CONCLUSION
In the footsteps of other European models and 
harmonisation projects, the theory of imprévision is now 
enshrined in the French Civil Code.  The novelty of Article 
1195 CC lies in the new judicial power of review. Some 
lawyers may fear a snowball effect of judicial intervention in 
commercial affairs. This paper should appease this anxiety as 
it is expected that French courts will exercise restraint when 
wielding their new power. Certainly, large businesses need not 
fear judicial discretion since they already have the know-how, 
which allows them to self-solve unforeseeability in detailed and 
sophisticated clauses. For smaller businesses, the framework 
for renegotiation, and when all else fails, the helping hand of 
experienced judges may be welcome.
The paradoxical attributes of Article 1195 CCC – the 
default rule, the dynamics of renegotiation and the judicial 
power of review – all operate to encourage parties to resolve 
disputes arising out of changed circumstances themselves. 
The strength of Article 1195 CC lies in its deterrent effect to 
avoid judicial interference and favour commercial solutions. 
The parties remain in control and the pact, albeit modified, 
is affirmed, thus reinforcing the principle of binding force of 
contracts. It highlights the importance of “the flexibility rather 
than the rigidity of the contract, its durability and its survival” 
in the face of unforeseeability as legal certainty requires 
some contractual flexibility (Pédamon & Chuah, Hardship 
in Transnational Commercial Contracts, (Paris Legal Publishers, 
2013), p 37). This is consistent with a utilitarian and more 
pragmatic vision of the contract that concentrates on its 
economic value and the need for variation under the threat 
of contractual failure due to unforeseeable events that render 
the performance commercially impracticable (Mazeaud, La 
révision du contrat, Rapport Français aux journées Capitant, 
les Petites Affiches, 30 January 2005, no 6). 
Catherine Pédamon
Senior Lecturer and Deputy Head for the LLM in International 
Commercial Law at Westminster Law School, University of 
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INTRODUCTION
Commercial registers are a traditional source of information 
and a service for merchants. They have recently been subject to 
reform and modernisation and have been joined by additional 
registers and databases in the pursuit of transparency. This 
article highlights recent reforms of commercial registers in 
Europe as well as challenges and opportunities arising from 
transparency registers and their relationship to the traditional 
commercial register.
A. COMPARATIVE REGISTER LAW 
IN EUROPE – MAIN FEATURES AND  
DIFFERENCES
There are two major types of commercial registers in 
Europe. Unsurprisingly they can be grouped along the lines of 
the traditional split between “civil” (or “continental” law) and 
common law jurisdictions. More technically, the continental 
register and notary systems follow a self-confessed “Latin” 
(Roman law) origin while the English system does not. As 
typical representatives of each type, the German and the 
English commercial registers can be examined here to set out 
the major features and differences between these two.
A.1 German commercial register
Commercial registers in Germany are hosted by the local 
courts of first instance (Amtsgerichte). The law governing 
the registers is mainly found in the Commercial Code 
(Handelsgesetzbuch, HGB). The traditional Handelsregister has 
been joined by the Unternehmensregister (“enterprise register”, 
a database of company information in the context of financial 
transactions) in 2006 in response to the European Union’s 
reform of companies registers and to improve transparency 
by way of Directives 2003/58/EC and 2004/109/EC. The 
implementing federal legislative act in Germany was the Gesetz 
über elektronische Handelsregister und Genossenschaftsregister sowie das 
Unternehmensregister (EHUG). Sections 8-9b HGB stipulate that 
both continue to be operated by the local courts. It is obvious 
that this generally establishes a significant level of fragmentation 
regarding the information on any corporate entity. Accessing 
information about any merchant or corporation used to require 
knowledge of the location of the relevant register court. Even 
though this would be part of the required information to be 
published by any merchant and displayed on stationery and 
official documents, there may be situations where an interested 
party does not have this information to hand. In a second step, 
the interested party would then have to contact the relevant 
register court and request information. This information 
comprises the name of the company (the firm, firma) details of 
the legal form and nature of a corporate entity, its constituting 
documents such as the shareholder agreement, its shareholders 
and their shares, its agents and representatives and in some 
cases its accounts and annual reports. This information is 
verified on the part of the merchant by notarisation and formal 
filing with the registrar. It is not verified as such by the register 
court. Companies and merchants can be held to account for 
the facts published in the commercial register. The published 
information constitutes a non-rebuttable presumption of 
correctness so that third parties can legally rely on it. This is 
called the publicity effect (Publizitaetswirkung) of the register. 
This legally binding declaratory effect is derived from the form 
and procedure vouching for the initial scrutiny of the content 
being filed.
A.2 English commercial register
By contrast, the English commercial register is hosted 
centrally by Companies House, a designated agency which 
hosts and operates the commercial register and acts as registrar. 
The registrar and the information required to be kept on file 
are governed by the Companies Act 2006, Part 34. The best- 
publicised difference to the continental register system is that 
the information on file is “not verified by Companies House” 
(when the difference is much rather that it is not notarised), 
but instead protected by rules contained in the Companies Act. 
Filing incorrect information constitutes an offence under the 
Companies Act (pursuant to Pt 35 of the Act, especially s 1112) 
and can lead to a company being struck off the register, its 
directors to be disqualified and even fined (see E below).  The 
actual information to be filed is very similar to that contained 
in continental registers. However, UK companies are required 
to report annually on their shareholders and officers as well 
as on their accounts instead of merely publishing changes as 
and when they occur, as English company law differs from 
continental incorporation laws.
Commercial registers and 
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A.3 Commonalities, pros and cons
Both register systems share the aim of a declaratory effect 
of the information filed and published. Both registers also 
exclusively confer constituting effects for instance in relation 
to limited liability, fungibility of shares or merchant status. The 
purpose of the selection of the information to be published 
is to provide traders and merchants with basic knowledge 
of each other’s business. This serves to provide a basis for 
decision-making when selecting business partners. Therefore, 
a degree of reliability has to be achieved and maintained. It 
is obvious that the English system places more trust into the 
self-regulatory forces of the merchant community than the 
continental system which has a more supervisory quality with 
a kind of guarantee function attributed to the local courts. 
The information to be published in the commercial registers 
needs to be authenticated by a notary public even after the 
reform of 2007 when the filing was taken over by the Federal 
Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) in order to simplify procedures both 
for the benefit of merchants and the justice system. The 
continental system is owed to historical development out of 
a highly fragmented political landscape that existed until deep 
into the twentieth century and a sense that trading was subject 
to licensing and privilege rather than an unconditional right 
and a natural occupation possibly even for the state itself. High 
aspirations as to the quality of the information are often paired 
with restrictions to access in this system, for example in land 
registries. The English system by contrast, fosters accessibility 
encouraging free flow of information in this sector, treating it 
as a commodity rather than a privilege.
B. REFORMS AT EU LEVEL: IMPROVING 
ACCESSIBILITY 
A look around the world shows the variety of ways of 
organising commercial registers and of attitudes to accessibility, 
including the provision of technical facilities such as online 
access. The internet platform ‘wikipedia’ offers a list of 
commercial registers around the world including an indication 
whether they are publicly accessible or searchable online 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_company_registers). 
The UK Government also provides a list of and links to foreign 
registries (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
overseas-registries/overseas-registries). The criterion of 
accessibility is the main anchor for a raft of modernisation and 
recent reform in the area of registers and databases. Closely 
related to the rather neutral aspect of accessibility is that of 
“transparency”. The latter term carries high aspirations across 
a range of applications and subject areas. It has been used in 
social and political debate and processes as well as in business 
related contexts defining monitoring and reporting standards 
and denoting access to information generally. It is certainly 
owed to this aspiration that the EU pushed for a modernisation 
and uniformisation of accessibility of commercial registers 
within the EU and the single market. Directive 2012/17/EU of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 
– amending Council Directive 89/666/EEC and Directives 
2005/56/EC and 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards the interconnection of central, 
commercial and companies registers – has  been operational 
since July 2017. The result is a significant improvement of 
ease of access and online accessibility of commercial registers 
throughout Europe. What used to be standard in the UK in 
terms of online access is now introduced in regard of German 
registries, too. 
In the UK, this may not be news, whereas in Germany, for 
the first time now, a company can be searched directly online 
from anywhere in the world. But is it really the same in terms 
of ease of use and scope of information?
The new German Register Portal (Gemeinsames Registerportal 
der Länder, joint register portal of the German states, English 
language version accessible at https://www.Handelsregister.de/
rp_web/welcome.do?language=en) has an English language 
user interface to initially access information. A simple name 
search without the actual company number to hand may 
be a little onerous (A name search can return a huge list of 
companies with the same initials or in alphabetical order. 
Furthermore, identical numbers are often assigned to several 
companies, clubs and associations only distinguished by the 
place of affiliation, ie the place of the local court, and the letter 
indicating the relevant section of the register – partnerships, 
companies, associations, patents – such as A, B, V or P) but will 
lead the user to the local court where a company or trader is 
registered where the search can be refined. Some (“published”) 
information is freely downloadable. Other information 
requires registration of the user and the payment of a small fee 
– much after the model of the UK Companies House. This is, 
however, where the difficulty arises for non-German speaking 
users: they are required to fill in the respective form to request 
such information in German. Whatever the limitations there, 
this initiative by the EU to create an EU wide standard for 
accessing company information online is truly splendid 
and provides a huge service to the international merchant 
community as well as to consumers.
C. DIGITAL ACCESSIBILITY: BLESSING OR 
CURSE?  
Information in digital form is certainly a blessing for 
users and providers of information services and operators 
of databases because they can catalogue, process, update, 
organise and distribute data timely and efficiently. It increases 
autonomy for users who become less dependent on the actual 
service provider and their opening times as well as postal and 
telecommunication services and it extends the geographical 
reach of the service provider as well as the data generally 
beyond its original jurisdiction into a virtually boundless space. 
This is certainly commensurate with the global trading space 
which has been growing through digital technology. At the 
same time, it can create an appetite for more data to be made 
accessible in this way. Besides the fact that data is also becoming 
a traded commodity as such – as commercial register content 
is being re-sold by third party providers – the idea of collecting 
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and publishing facts and information about not only relevant 
themes but about anything at all in the form of registers and 
databases gains more feasibility with the advent of digitisation 
and digitalisation. This has most likely supported the creation 
of further new registers at EU level or at the initiative of the 
EU. The term transparency has emerged in this context and 
applies to a range of different subject areas and policies. In 
view of the general possibilities that digital information offers 
it is therefore necessary to distinguish by the aims of each 
transparency initiative, its intended addressees and the content 
to be made accessible and to whom. 
Closely related to this is of course the area of data protection 
and privacy as bastion of civil liberty or even a human right. 
Self-determination is probably one of the key criteria by which 
to measure the quality of data protection initiatives. Technical 
data safety has to be accompanied by a strong commitment 
to the protection of individual persons’ and companies’ 
right to “informational self-determination” (informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung) recognising the legal position of the data 
owner. Whether the EU has done enough in this respect with 
its latest General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
(GDPR) is doubtful, given the strong interest in the generation 
of databases as described in this paper. This interest is shared 
by the state along with commercial enterprises and constitutes 
a pull factor into the opposite direction. Prioritising correctly 
within this conflict of interest is a central and indispensable 
task of the legislature and judicial organs (see further D.2 
below). 
D. TRANSPARENCY REGISTERS AND 
RELATED ONLINE DATABASES 
One of the so-called transparency registers was established 
in the course of the European Transparency Initiative and aims 
to provide transparency in the area of political lobbying of the 
EU organs. The register is freely accessible and searchable 
by everyone and contains the details of organisations and 
individuals who aim at influencing law-making in the EU. 
Official lobbying meetings where stakeholders can explain 
their views and interests with EU policy makers can only 
take place with registered parties. This is to serve the public’s 
interest to remain involved as much as possible in the 
selection of policies and legal instruments prior to the formal 
legislative process which is public. It also serves to counteract 
an impression of behind the scenes manipulation of the 
political process by powerful economic interests and therefore 
maintain the trust of the public in the integrity of the process 
of lawmaking and governing, or even reinforcing a sense of 
being in control. Critique of the new register has included 
the fact that registration was voluntary which has now been 
counteracted by a requirement that official lobbying meetings 
can only take place with registered persons or entities. Another 
point of criticism was the lack of control regarding the figures 
given by lobbyists about the budget which they allocate to their 
activities (on the evolution of the EU transparency register see 
Godowska, Magdalena, Y B Polish Eur Stud 2011 (14):181-
200; Milicevic, Aleksandra, 2017; the Mandatory Transparency 
Register Initiative – Towards a Better Governance of Lobbying 
in the EU, Revija za evropsko pravo 19 (1):71-113.). Whether 
this register really eliminated any “behind the scenes” activity 
must remain doubtful, therefore. It is certainly a welcome 
innovation and a step into the right direction.
D.1 Transparency in relation to private corporate entities  
Using the same term, transparency, a new type of register has 
arrived on the scene in recent years in relation to the registration 
of information relating to private corporate entities. Germany 
has introduced the so called “transparency register” in respect 
of those entities which are not already obliged to register with 
the commercial register, Handelsregister. This new database is 
called the Transparenzregister. It has been made operational and 
searchable as of July 2017 and can be consulted by visiting the 
website https://www.Transparenzregister.de. This register is not 
searchable by everyone but only by certain specified persons 
and entities for specified reasons upon formal registration of 
their own details with the registry (according to s 23 of the 
German federal money laundering act (Gesetz über das Aufspüren 
von Gewinnen aus schweren Straftaten (Geldwäschegesetz - GwG) and 
the regulation Transparenzregistereinsichtnahmeverordnung of 19 
Dezember 2017, Official Bulletin (BGBl) I p 3984). It can be said 
that it effectively functions as a residual or fall-back register in 
relation to the obligation to provide the relevant data. It may be 
understood to make up for the “deficiency” of the commercial 
register of not being mandatory and comprehensive in 
relation to all corporate entities. The register was prompted 
by the obligation of the Federal Republic of Germany to 
implement the so-called Fourth Money Laundering Directive 
(Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of 
the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or 
terrorist financing) as well as the Directive regarding financial 
transactions (Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on information 
accompanying transfers of funds). A similar register was 
introduced in the UK, of course relying on the identical EU 
Directives. In the UK, the respective data collection is called 
the “Persons with Significant Control” register (PSC register). 
This “register” has to be kept and publicised by each company 
according to Part 21A (section 790M) of and Schedules 1A and 
1B to the Companies Act 2006 as well as the Small Business 
Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, Part 7 and Schedule 
3 (See also https://www.gov.uk/government/news/people-
with-significant-control-companies-house-register-goes-live.). 
Number 64 of the Explanatory Notes to the 2015 Act reads:
 At the G8 summit in Lough Erne in June 2013 the UK, 
alongside the rest of the G8 [n: now G7], committed to a 
number of measures to enhance corporate transparency in order 
to tackle the misuse of companies. The Government published a 
discussion paper on these proposals in July 2013, and published 
the Government response to the views received on the discussion 
paper in April 2014. The measures included in Part 7 of the 
Act (linked to measures in Parts 8 and 9) are intended to deliver 
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these commitments. These include the commitment to introduce 
a register of individuals who exercise significant control over 
a company; the removal and prohibition of the use of bearer 
shares; the prohibition of corporate directors, except in certain 
circumstances and measures to deter opaque arrangements 
involving directors and make individual controlling directors more 
accountable.
The PSC register consists of additional information to be 
filed with the regular Companies House returns. Other than 
the German counterpart, it is not a separate register, and 
the information is accessible (for a fee) to all who search the 
Companies House records.
D.2. Transparency in relation to taxation – country-by-country 
reporting
Another recent arrival on the scene of registers and 
databases professing to enhance transparency is the so-called 
country-by-country reporting devised by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) through 
their so-called Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 
Plan, Action 13 (Published as OECD 2015, Transfer Pricing 
Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting, Action 13 - 2015 
Final Report OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
Project (Paris, OECD)). The OECD introduce their report 
with reference to transparency efforts:
The Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan 
adopted by the OECD and G20 countries in 2013 recognised 
that enhancing transparency for tax administrations by providing 
them with adequate information to assess high-level transfer 
pricing and other BEPS-related risks is a crucial aspect for 
tackling the BEPS problem (see http://www.oecd.org/tax/
beps/country-by-country-reporting.htm).
This database will collate information regarding the amount 
of tax paid by multinational enterprises, so-called MNE groups, 
in each of their countries of operation by way of a report to 
be filed by MNE groups to the national tax authorities who 
are then entitled to exchange this information according 
to the recently entered into force Multilateral Convention 
on Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters as well as Tax 
Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) and so-called 
Model Competent Authority Agreements (MCCAs). Based on 
this legal framework, the OECD reports:
As of September 2018, there are over 1800 bilateral exchange 
relationships activated with respect to jurisdictions committed to 
exchanging CbC reports, and the first automatic exchanges of 
CbC reports took place in June 2018. These include exchanges 
between the 72 signatories to the CbC Multilateral Competent 
Authority Agreement, between EU Member States under EU 
Council Directive 2016/881/EU and between signatories 
to bilateral competent authority agreements for exchanges 
under Double Tax Conventions or Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements, including over 35 bilateral agreements with the 
United States. Jurisdictions continue to negotiate arrangements 
for the exchange of CbC reports and the OECD will publish 
regular updates, to provide clarity for MNE Groups and tax 
administrations
These requirements far exceed previous entitlements of the 
tax authorities. As for Germany, the courts had strictly rejected 
this type of “fishing expedition” in earlier case law. In the case 
decided in 2016 by the tax court in Cologne (Finanzgericht 
Köln), 2 V 1375/15, the tax authorities of the E6 group 
exchanged information to create a “case profile” about the W 
group, their corporate structure and business model in order 
to derive information about similar cases and how to adapt 
laws and practices accordingly. BEPS was said to be the basis 
for this. The court barred the German fiscal authority from 
sharing this profile because there was no concrete reason for 
this and hence no legal basis, it was a fishing expedition. In a 
case decided by the FG Baden-Württemberg (Tax Court Baden-
Wuerttemberg) on 25 June 2015 (3 K 2419/14) a German 
tax authority sought to gather information from a German 
company about its Italian business partners on behalf of the 
Italian tax authority (Guardia di Finanza). The court barred 
this enquiry due to the lack of relevance of the requested 
information for the taxation of the German company as well 
as due to the availability of the requested information in the 
public domain. The enquiry by the tax office was based on 
the EU Directives 2011/16/EU and 2014/107/EU (Revised 
Directive on Administrative Cooperation, DAC). On successful 
revision, the Federal Tax Court, Bundesfinanzhof, reversed the 
decision (judgment of 12 September 2017, I R 97/15) and 
reverted to the state tax court for reconsideration, albeit purely 
on procedural grounds rather than deciding on the merits of 
the case. (The case has not be re-decided yet.) The new laws 
emanating from international platforms like the OECD may 
be understood to provide enabling norms for the very action 
barred by the courts earlier. As I have explained elsewhere 
(Heidemann, Maren, 2017, “Is Internationalisation Going 
Too Far? – Constitutional Challenges of International Data 
Exchange Programmes”, EBLR 28 (5):847-78), there is little 
or no constitutional evaluation of the legitimacy of this recent 
campaign to order comprehensive reporting duties on the part 
of enterprises which enable general fishing expeditions by tax 
authorities. The aim of these enquiries is to gather information 
to be able to discern ‘patterns’ which might indicate unlawful 
behaviour (eg incorrect transfer pricing) as a prompt for official 
investigations. This has been criticised as inviting error and 
unfounded suspicion (Borges, Alexandre Siciliano, and Caio 
Augusto Takano, 2017, “The Improper Use of Country-by-
Country Reports: Some Concerns on the Brazilian Approach to 
BEPS Action 13”, Intertax 45 (12):841-51; Grotherr, Siegfried, 
2017, Automatischer Informationsaustausch im Steuerrecht 
ueber laenderbezogene Berichte von Konzernunternehmen–
Rechtsgrundlagen, Inhalt, Datenschutz und Probleme beim 
CbC-Reporting, RIW 63 (1-2):1-17).
E. EVALUATION
The legal initiatives and registers described above provide a 
whole cluster of sources of information. Does the accumulation 
of these sources equal an increase in transparency, though? And 
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what ends would this transparency serve? Are the intended 
aims achieved by the traditional and more recent registers and 
reporting duties mentioned above?
There are two distinctions to be made in an evaluation of 
the new facilities: whose transparency do they serve; and what 
are the legal consequences of non-compliance? 
First, the mission of traditional commercial registers is 
to enable traders to make prima facie judgments about their 
potential business partners and monitor existing business 
partners. They collate and publish selected key information 
which indicates basic facts about the commercial standing 
of the business partner, such as companies and partnerships 
as well as their individual officers. It indicates the size of 
the business, its success or failure, its compliance standard, 
whether it is in administration or a director is suspended. 
While this information is not exhaustive and cannot replace 
further research and an individual risk assessment for any 
business partners or investors, it is primarily directed towards 
the merchant community and the markets. It wants to 
ensure a minimum standard of transparency and integrity in 
the marketplace. To achieve this, the information has to be 
accurate and up to date. Annual reporting and enforcement 
rules serve this aim. 
In line with this, the mission behind the digitisation of 
commercial registers, or company registers as they may be 
referred to, is aimed at improving access to this relevant 
information to merchants across a larger geographical area by 
creating registers which reach in fact across borders, so in a 
way these registers are now transnational without adding to the 
administrative burden for companies.
By contrast, the mission behind creating transparency 
registers seems somewhat different. Beneficiaries of the EU 
transparency register of lobbyists can be said to be the general 
public or the integrity of a political process in general. The 
mission can be described as signalling to the EU public that 
efforts are made to disclose the economic interests being 
“peddled” at EU decision-making bodies and to enforce certain 
guidelines and red tape in order to prevent undue influence 
on any holders of public office. Due to the weaknesses that 
remain in this system as sketched above this mission may not 
be accomplished just yet.
A mission of similar nature can be discerned in the 
further registers and databases created under the heading 
of transparency register registering ‘beneficial ownership’ 
and ‘CbC’ reporting. The public interest that seems to be 
served here consists of a rather suggestive understanding of 
crime prevention. It also serves the day to day business of the 
national tax authorities in helping to compile a global mosaic 
of information provided by multi-national enterprises which 
combined may reveal patterns which may indicate illegal 
behaviour. It is submitted here that the latter type of database 
lacks relevancy and exceeds any justifiable public interest. 
The former ‘register’ of beneficial ownership conflates legal 
and factual relationships of individuals with their businesses 
and corporate entities and may therefore lead users without 
legal training to conclusions which are unjustified and legally 
wrong. The interest in some of this information seems to lack 
relevancy to the merchant community and remains of a purely 
anecdotal quality to the general public if disclosed.
Second, as described above, accuracy of the information 
published in commercial registers is monitored and enforced 
differently in different jurisdictions. Information may be 
actively verified by a notary or the official registry or accuracy 
may be protected by corresponding offences contained in 
the law. In the UK, Part 36 of the 2006 Act contains a list 
of offences, breach of which can lead to convictions including 
imprisonment and the payment of fines. The “first ever” case 
of such a conviction of a persistent offender was reported in 
March this year: businessman Kevin Brewer was fined £12,000 
upon repeated fraudulent incorporation of companies and 
registering prominent figures of pubic life as directors and 
shareholders without their knowledge, thereby breaching 
section 1112 of the Companies Act 2006 (see https://www.gov.
uk/government/news/uks-first-ever-successful-prosecution-
for-false-company-information). The declaratory function of 
the information is also primarily utilised as evidence within 
private enforcement mechanisms, for instance by precluding a 
defence in civil proceedings against an innocent creditor who 
acts in reliance on the information published.
Similarly, the EU lobbyists’ transparency register has 
a conditional gateway function if and when lobbying is 
undertaken. 
By contrast, in the case of the transparency registers and 
CbC reporting providing the information is mandatory and 
not directed at business partners or serving civil enforcement 
of private claims as described above. It is part of internal public 
administration and an end in itself.
F. CONCLUSIONS 
The traditional commercial registers have been joined 
over the past decade by a number of additional registers and 
databases to be populated by information about companies, 
merchants and private individuals. Adding to the traditional 
function of providing information and a level playing field in 
the market place, new functions are being performed by these. 
In addition to increasing the range of users of commercial 
registers by making them electronically accessible across the 
EU, electronic accessibility is used to provide transparency 
for a number of objectives. Transparency is not always that 
of the general public, investors or potential trading partners, 
though. Some of the new registers are register in name only; 
they are either databases collated by the authorities to whom 
the respective information is disclosed, or just additional 
content in regular reports or constituting documents. The 
EU lobbyists’ transparency register for instance could be 
called a freely searchable public database with information 
more of an informational nature rather than a legal basis for 
further action or decision making. The CbC reporting at the 
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other end of the spectrum by contrast could be said to form 
a register in the hands of the fiscal authorities who collate the 
information covertly by way of international data exchanges. It 
is not as such freely accessible by the public, in fact it remains 
hidden from the public, and therefore contributes little to 
transparency in this respect, but rather to the authorities’ 
transparency only. Finally, the so-called transparency register 
listing “beneficial owners” of companies and other corporate 
entities in Germany is also not freely accessible and so cannot 
contribute to transparency as may be desired by the general 
public, but provides a rather elusive basis for consideration to 
those authorities who are entitled to refer to it. As regards the 
information collated, this is to a great extent already in the 
public domain. As far as it imposes duties and obligations on 
persons who were not previously required to be listed in this 
way, it may lack a constitutional basis for this duty. Scrutiny 
has not yet been exercised in regard of these registers. It is 
assumed that “transparency” is desirable and prevents crime, 
presupposing that there is crime on a level that justifies and 
necessitates the imposition of mandatory disclosure of this 
nature. 
By way of example, one detail may illustrate the legal 
problem that the new “register” poses: in Germany charitable 
foundations are private non-commercial corporate entities. 
They do not have members and they have no beneficiaries 
in a strict legal sense. The volunteer directors of German 
charitable foundations are now required to be listed in the 
new German transparency register as “beneficial owners” 
(wirtschaftlich Berechtigte). This is not helpful at all for German 
charitable foundations who already suffer from the very weak 
infrastructure that German law provides for them. Not only 
are foundations creatures of state law rather than federal law, 
there is also no register for them as there is for commercial 
entities (which would be comparable to the UK register of 
charitable bodies). This makes it very hard for foundations 
to deal outside their state of incorporation (their seat) and 
specifically abroad where they lack a presentable means of 
identification such as a registration number. Foundations are 
listed by their regulatory bodies, but even if this is in electronic 
form, these lists are not proper registers but mere databases. 
The advent of the transparency register may be seen to help 
this situation. The classification of boards of directors of 
charitable foundations as beneficial owners, though, can be 
misleading – it can induce the erroneous belief that directors 
are members of the corporate entity or have any financial 
entitlements or interests in it. This is not the case under the 
German law of incorporation of private charitable foundations. 
The notion of “persons with significant control” is not used 
in the German terminology. It can therefore be said that the 
German transparency register creates false impressions rather 
than transparency. In the UK, the requirement for example 
to list shadow directors as “beneficial owners” or persons of 
significant control poses a similar problem in that relationships 
between individuals and businesses or corporate entities are 
created which have no precise legal description. Percentages 
in shareholdings are often used to describe the notion of 
significant control. It is, however, a well-known problem that 
in the context of large scale professional asset management, 
persons (clients) are not always aware of their ownership at 
any given moment and so rather large grey areas are left by 
the legislation. It creates the illusion of simplicity where there 
is none. This is even more so in the description of a shadow 
director whose role may manifest gradually over a long period 
of time and the threshold for triggering the registration duty 
may be unclear especially for legally untrained persons who 
after all constitute the majority of the business community. 
As for the value of the information logged, a word of 
caution may also be in order. Much of the information in the 
PSC or transparency registers will be in the public domain, so 
that bundling the information in a different format may lead 
to confusion rather than clarification as adding more layers 
of the same thing is not normally a recipe for simplification. 
This approach may create the impression of added disclosure 
and hence greater transparency. In order to understand and 
use the information properly the user needs some basic 
knowledge of the law or business practice. To users without 
such a minimum level of experience the registers may once 
again be misleading, especially because they were promoted 
as having been prompted by crime committed, for instance 
by the owners of so-called letter box companies. It has to be 
asked whether there is added value in relation to ordinary 
electronic freely searchable commercial registers or rather an 
increased compliance burden and significant defaulting risk 
for the obligated parties with the registers stating the obvious 
or lacking relevancy. On the one hand investors and potential 
business partners would certainly benefit from information for 
instance about shadow directors. Information about ultimate 
beneficial owners would save the user researching potentially 
across a multitude of registers globally some of which may not 
be freely and remotely searchable. This should be considered 
to be a service, though, rather than an act of crime prevention. 
Ownership and entitlement as such are no crime. The onus of 
detection investigation and legal evaluation of criminal activity 
remains with the public authorities. A certain preventive 
effect may be assumed. It is questionable though, whether the 
above described corresponding risk (reputational, compliance 
risks) has been scrutinised sufficiently prior to enacting 
the new mandatory and rather harsh legislation in terms of 
relevancy, effectiveness, proportionality, due process and other 
constitutional values. In case of the CbC reporting, the desired 
effect is only achieved by way of the international data exchange 
agreements as proposed and headed by the OECD. 
The quality of the collated data described above resembles 
that of the transparency registers and PSC register in terms 
of availability in the public domain and indicator function 
for criminal or non-compliant behaviour. While the users of 
CbC reports may always be professionals in fiscal authorities 
around the world, this does not resolve the risk (involuntarily) 
undertaken by the owners of the data as to misuse and 
misunderstanding owed to the nature of electronic data as 
well as the discrepancy between where the likely damage is 
to arise and where the benefit is expected to materialise. The 
compliance risk on the part of the users, ie the tax authorities, 
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is particularly high due to an inherent conflict of interest 
caused by a discrepancy between infringement and damage: 
monitoring and enforcing compliance is in the interest of the 
data owners but not controlled by them whereas the same is 
not necessarily in the interest of those who actually control 
and enforce. 
In conclusion it can therefore be said that the combination 
of instantaneous worldwide electronic accessibility and the 
widening of data to be provided to registers in connection with 
commercial acting poses as yet unresolved legal risks to the 
data owners and even to the integrity of the market place, for 
instance by lowering thresholds and pushing more participants 
into niches and even illegality. The boundaries between mere 
additional content, databases and registers are blurred by the 
use of ambitious terminology in this field and by responding 
to expectations which have been extensively promoted to 
the public by way of news reporting (“Panama papers”) and 
in some cases activism in the form of Parliamentary scrutiny 
committees (most prominently, Dame Margaret Hodge led 
the public enquiry as chair of the Commons Public Accounts 
Committee into the tax affairs on multinational enterprises, 
MNEs, which led to reputational losses and in some cases 
voluntary and random tax payments, see for instance 
“Starbucks, Google and Amazon Grilled over Tax Avoidance,” 
BBC News website, 12 November 2012, Business) but which 
may much rather be prompted by long standing desires 
for more competences of the fiscal authorities to collate 
information which they were previously prevented from by the 
courts as well as by a vague expectation of an increase in tax 
revenue. There is a regrettable lack of judicial review in this 
area of legislative activity, in particular that originating from 
the OECD which lacks democratic oversight and a rule of law-
based infrastructure comparable to that of the EU. So, despite a 
welcome innovative progress in this area of law, caution should 
be exercised in extending reporting duties and registration 
facilities without corresponding safeguards for the benefit of 
both users and data owners. Innovation should benefit the data 
owners as much as the users of the data and must take issues of 
privacy and due process into account.
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